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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the EU is not as unique a governance system as the Babylonian 
variety of its labels may suggest. Like its member states, the EU features a combination 
of  different  forms  of  governance  that  cover  the  entire  range  between  market  and 
hierarchy. Unlike at the national level, however, this governance mix entails hardly any 
network forms of governance, which systematically involve private actors. The EU is 
largely  governed  by  negotiated  agreements  between  inter-  and  transgovernmental 
actors. While business, interest groups or civil society organizations are seldom granted 
a real say in EU policy-making, market-based mechanisms of political competition have 
gained importance. Thus, the EU is less characterized by network governance but by 
inter- and transgovernmental negotiations, on the one hand, and political competition 
between member states and regions, on the other. Both operate in shadow of hierarchy 
cast by supranational institutions.  
 
1.   Introduction1 
 
This paper explores the nature of European Governance. It is often argued in the literature 
that the EU system of multilevel governance is unique and therefore cannot be compared to 
any other form of political order we are familiar with both, at the national and international 
level. Political scientists have shown a remarkable creativity in developing new concepts to 
capture  the  sui  generis  nature  of  the  EU,  describing  it  as  a  “new,  post-Hobbsian  order“ 
(Schmitter, 1991), „a post-modern state“ (Ruggie, 1993; Caparaso, 1996), or “a network of 
pooling and sharing sovereignty“ (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991) 
 
This paper, by  contrast, argues that the EU is  not as unique  a  governance system as the 
Babylonian  variety  of  its  labels  may  suggest.  Like  its  member  states,  the  EU  features  a 
combination of different forms of governance that cover the entire range between market and 
hierarchy.  Unlike  at  the  national  level,  however,  this  governance  mix  entails  hardly  any 
“modern” (Kooiman, 1993) or “cooperative“ (Mayntz, 1998) modes of governance, which 
systematically involve private actors. The EU is largely governed by negotiated agreements 
between inter- and transgovernmental actors. While business, interest groups or civil society 
organizations are seldom granted a real say in EU policy-making, market-based mechanisms 
of  political  competition  have  gained  importance.  Thus,  the  EU  is  less  characterized  by 
network  governance  (Rhodes,  1997;  Eising  and  Kohler-Koch,  1999)  but  by  inter-  and 
transgovernmental negotiations on the one hand, and political competition between member 
states and subnational authorities, on the other. Both operate in shadow of hierarchy cast by 
supranational institutions. 
 
In order to develop this argument, the paper proceeds in three steps. The first part develops an 
analytical  framework  that  is  based  on  a  broad  concept  of  governance  as  institutionalized 
forms of political coordination. It draws on the classical distinction between market, hierarchy 
and  networks  as  governance  structures  but  complements  them  with  a  second,  procedural 
dimension that focuses on the modes of social coordination. The second part applies this 
analytical  framework  to  study  the  structures  and  processes  of  European  governance.  The 
analysis  will  show  that  EU  policies  are  largely  formulated  and  implemented  in  multiple 
                                                 
1   I am thankful to Ingeborg Tömmel, Arthur Benz, Andrea Lenschow, Nicole Bolleyer, Sandra Eckert, Diana 
Panke, Thomas Risse, Carina Sprungk und Tobias Hofmann for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
Special thanks go to Lars Schäfer, Peter Dylling-Brenzinger, Annabelle Merklin and Andreas Oldenburg for 
their excellent research assistance.  
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overlapping negotiation systems. Yet, network relations that span across sectors and levels of 
government are a not a sui generis character of the EU but a core feature of modern statehood 
(Scharpf, 1991; cf. Benz, 2001; Leibfried and Zürn, 2006). Likewise, EU policy-making can 
rely on a strong shadow of hierarchy cast by supranational institutions. The key distinction 
between the EU and the modern state lies in the subordinate role of private and public interest 
groups in the EU negotiation systems, which are largely dominated by governmental actors. 
While forms of private self-regulation or public-private co-regulation abound in the member 
states, we hardly find any network governance at the EU-level. Instead, political competition 
has gained increasing importance, particularly since the introduction of the Open Method of 
Coordination and the application of the principle of mutual recognition to areas outside the 
Internal  Market.  The  paper  concludes  with  some  considerations  on  why  trans-  and 
intergovernmental  negotiation  systems  and  political  competition  have  flourished  under 
shadow  of  hierarchy  cast  by  supranational  institutions  while  new  forms  of  governance 
involving private actors are still rare. 
 
2.   Governance and EU Policy-Making 
 
2.1.   What is Governance? 
 
The Governance concept has made quite a career, not only in European Studies but also in 
other  areas  of  political  science  (Schuppert,  2005).  Yet,  despite  its  success,  there  is  a 
Babylonian variety of definitions that can be quite confusing. It would go beyond the scope of 
this  paper  to  provide  an  overview  of  the  (European)  governance  literature.2  Rather,  this 
section  seeks  to  develop  a  governance  typology,  which  draws  on  existing  concepts  and 
approaches and allows to systematically compare the different forms of governance and their 
various combinations with those of other political systems, such as states or international 
organizations.  
 
Following the works of Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf, governance is understood as 
institutionalized  modes  of  coordination  through  which  collectively  binding  decisions  are 
adopted and implemented. (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995b; Mayntz, 2004; Scharpf, 2000). In this 
understanding, governance consists of both structure and process (Scharpf, 1997: 97; Mayntz 
and  Scharpf,  1995:  19).  Governance  structures  relate  to  the  institutions  and  actor 
                                                 
2   Cf. Börzel, 2005a; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006.  
 
4 
constellations while modes of social coordination refer to the processes which influence and 
alter the behaviour of actors. Governance structures and governance processes are inherently 
linked since institutions constitute arenas for social coordination and regulate their access, 
allocate competencies and resources for actors and influence their action orientations.  
 
2.1.1  Governance as institutionalized rule structures 
 
Research on governance usually distinguishes three different types of institutionalized rule 
structures: hierarchy, market (competition systems)3 and negotiation systems.4 These are ideal 
types,  which  differ  with  regard  to  the  degree  of  coupling  largely  defined  by  institutions. 
Hierarchies are based on an institutionalized relationship of domination and subordination, 
which  significantly  constrains  the  autonomy  of  subordinate  actors  (tight  coupling).  In 
negotiation and competitions systems, the formal relation between actors is equal. While they 
may differ with regard to their bargaining power or competitiveness, none is subject to the 
will of the other. The institutions of competition systems do not provide for any structural 
coupling. Actors have full autonomy to coordinate themselves through the mutual adjustment 
of their actions. Negotiation systems are characterized by loose coupling. Social coordination 
is  based  on  mutual  agreement.  Unlike  formalized  negotiation  systems,  the  symmetrical 
relations of networks are not defined by formal institutions but constituted by mutual resource 
dependencies and/or informal norms of equality.  
 
The degree of coupling is defined by institutions. So are the actor constellations within the 
institutionalized  rule  structures.  Institutions  allocate  resources  to  actors  and  regulate  their 
access  to  decision-making  arenas.  Unlike  private  actors,  institutions  bestow  upon  public 
actors the power to unilaterally impose decisions, even though they refrain from invoking 
their hierarchical authority when acting in negotiation and competition systems. Public actors 
can also define  and modify the institutional rules of negotiation  and competition systems 
thereby shaping actor constellations. (Mayntz, 1996: 156-160; Scharpf 1997: 36-50). Finally, 
public actors have an institutional mandate to pursue the public interest. While they may be 
                                                 
3   In the political science literature, markets are not regarded as forms of governance since they are based on 
spontaneous interactions that leave “no place for ‘conscious, deliberate and purposeful’ effort to craft formal 
structures”, (Williamson, 1996: 31). Yet, market mechanisms can be institutionalized to coordinate actors 
behaviour through competition (Benz, i.E.). This paper uses the concept of competition systems to describe 
the institutionalization of market-based modes of political coordination. 
4   The literature discusses other characteristics of networks, such as actor constellations that equally involve 
public and private actors (Mayntz, 1993b) or relations based on trust, which favour problem-solving over 
bargaining as the dominant action orientation (Scharpf, 1997: 137-138; Benz, 2001: 171). However, such as 
narrow concept of network governance is flawed both in theoretical and empirical terms (cf. Börzel, 1998).  
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guided by their self-interest, public actors have to justify their actions and face sanctions for 
rent-seeking or corrupt behaviour (Scharpf, 1991: 630; cf. Scharpf 1997: 178-183).  
 
While political hierarchies are confined to public actors, negotiation and competition systems 
may  vary  in  their  actor  constellations.  Inter-  or  transgovernnmental5  negotiation  systems 
comprise public actors only, who may come from different policy sectors and/or level of 
government.  Intermediate  negotiation  systems  bring  together  public  actors  with 
representatives of business and/or societal interests (Mayntz, 1993b; Scharpf, 1993. They are 
often  referred  to  as  “cooperative”  (Mayntz,  1998),  “modern”  (Kooiman,  1993)  or  simply 
“new” modes of governance.6 Some authors reserve governance only for informal networks 
and formalized negotiation systems between public and private actors, which are then referred 
to as network governance (Rhodes, 1997; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999). Private negotiation 
systems do not include public actors. They take the form of “private interest-government“ in 
associations (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) ant the so called “private regimes“ as they have 
emerged in international politics (cf. Cutler, Haufler and Porter, 1999).  
 
In competition systems, it is not only private actors that compete for the provision of public 
goods and services, e.g. when they are contracted out. Public actors, such as universities, 
often participate in the competition. Regulatory or tax competition, by contrast, is confined to 
public  actors  (states,  regions,  municipalities),  since  only  they  hold  the  competencies  for 
setting collectively binding regulations and taxation (Benz, 2001: 171-173; Benz, i.E.).  
 
2.1.2   Governance as modes of coordination 
 
Institutionalized rule structures induce certain  modes of social  coordination. (vgl. Scharpf 
1997). Thus, governance processes and structures are causally linked. Governance structures 
do  not  determine  but  rather  promote  specific  modes  of  coordination.  They  provide  a 
“possibility  frontier”  (Möglichkeitsgrenzen),  which  does  not  support  institutionally  more 
demanding  modes  (Scharpf,  2000:  90-94;  Scharpf  1997:  46-49).  Thus,  hierarchical 
coordination is not feasible in negotiation or competition systems. The latter also preclude the 
use of non-hierarchical modes of bargaining and arguing. 
                                                 
5   Drawing  on  Keohane  und  Nye,  transgovernmental  negotiation  systems  are  defined  as  a  “set  of  direct 
interactions  among  sub-units  of  different  governments  that  are  not  controlled  or  closely  guided  by  the 
policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments” define (Keohane and Nye, 1974: 43). 
6   Héritier,  2003;  cf.  the  Integrated  Project  “New  Modes  of  Governance  in  Europe”  coordinated  by  the 
European University Institute in Florence.  
 
6 
 
There are hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of coordination. Hierarchical coordination 
usually  takes  the  form  of  authoritative  decisions  (e.g.  administrative  ordinances,  court 
decisions) actors must obey. Hierarchical coordination or direction (Scharpf 1997) can, hence, 
force  actors  to  act  against  their  self-interests  (Scharpf  1997:  171).  They  may  be  either 
physically coerced by the use of force or legally obliged by legitimate institutions (law). Note 
that  even  majority  voting  entails  a  genuine  element  of  hierarchical  coordination  since  it 
imposes the will of the majority upon the minority (Scharpf 1997: 155/156). 
 
Non-hierarchical coordination, by contrast, is based on voluntary compliance. Conflicts of 
interests are solved by negotiations. Voluntary agreement is either achieved by negotiating a 
compromise and granting mutual concessions (side-payments and issue-linkage) on the basis 
of  fixed  preferences  (bargaining).  Or  actors  engage  in  processes  of  non-manipulative 
persuasion  (arguing),  through  which  they  develop  common  interests  and  change  their 
preferences accordingly (Benz, 1994: 118-127; Börzel and Risse, 2005). 
 
Coordination in competition systems is also non-hierarchical. Actors compete over meeting 
certain performance criteria, to which they adjust their behaviour accordingly (cf. Benz, i.E.). 
They are largely motivated by egoistic self-interests. But they pursue a common goal or some 
scarce resources of which they wish to obtain as much as possible by performing better than 
their  competitors.  Political  competition  induces  actors  to  contribute  to  the  provision  of 
collective  goods  and  services  by  pursuing  their  self-interests.  Unlike  under  private 
competition, their performance is evaluated and rewarded by institutionally defined criteria 
legitimized by public authorities. 
 
2.1.3  The Combination or Embeddedness of Institutionalized Rule Structures 
 
The institutionalized rule structures and their embedded modes of coordination are ideal types 
and are hardly found in reality. Rather, we find combinations, both, within and beyond the 
state (Benz, 2001: 175-202). “Governance regimes“ (Benz) or governance mixes (Börzel, 
2007b) are different combinations of the ideal types, embedding one in the other by making 
one subordinate to the other (“shadow)” or nesting them, i.e. linking them horizontally. 
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The three types of negotiation systems are often embedded in hierarchical structures. Almost 
always, public and private actors negotiate under a shadow of hierarchy. This is also true for 
political competition systems, since public actors usually set the legal rules of the game and 
intervene to prevent market distortions or correct outcomes that violate public interests. In a 
similar vein, hierarchies and negotiation systems can operate in the shadow of the market. 
New Public Management, for instance, seeks to place public administrations in a political 
competition for good performance with each other and/or with private organizations (Benz, 
2006: 10). Likewise, states or regions may compete in setting business-friendly regulation or 
taxation  in  order  to  attract  economic  investments  and  avoid  competitive  disadvantages, 
respectively (Héritier et al., 1994). The institutional framework for political competition may 
not only be set by hierarchies (e.g. states) but can also be negotiated. Thus, the World Treat 
Organization shapes the conditions for regulatory competition among states in the same way 
as  international  regimes  set  important  parameters  for  state  regulation  in  the  field  of 
environment, security or human rights. 
 
Embeddedness implies a ranking between the different institutionalized rule structures. The 
dominant rule structure sets or changes the rules of the game for the subordinate rule structure 
and entitles actors to intervene in order to correct or substitute policy outcomes. As a result, 
the primary rule structure casts an institutional shadow which has a significant influence on 
the action orientation of the actors in the secondary rule structure. Nestedness, by contrast, 
requires actors in the different rule structures to coordinate their actions in order to reach a 
political  decision  and  implement  it,  respectively.  This  is  particularly  the  case  if  policy 
processes involve multiple arenas. (Benz, 2006: 12). 
 
In order to systematically capture and account for the governance mix in the European Union, 
the  next  section  develops  and  analytical  framework  that  applies  the  governance  typology 
introduced above to EU policy-making.  
 
2.2 European Governance: An Analytical Framework 
 
The  analytical  framework  takes  as  a  starting  point  the  institutions  that  define  the  rule 
structures of EU policy-making. Institutions determine which actors have access to the policy 
process, give them resources to pursue their interests and define their relationships with each 
other.  Not  only  do  they  oblige  actors  to  follow  certain  rules  constraining  their  strategic  
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choices. Institutions also entail standards for appropriate behaviour (norms), which influence 
the preferences, perceptions and action orientations of actors in policy-making. (March and 
Olsen,  1989;  Scharpf,  1997:  38-43).  The  institutions  of  EU  policy-making  are  largely 
constituted by European Primary Law. At the same time, a whole set of informal institutions 
has emerged, which are more difficult to capture. 
 
The analytical framework focuses on the formal institutions since they largely define the rule 
structures  supporting  different  modes  of  coordination  in  EU  policy-making.  Moreover, 
priority is given to the decision-making stage because the implementation of EU policies is 
subject to rather uniform rules that only vary between the First Pillar and the Second and 
Third Pillar, respectively. In principle, the member states are responsible for implementation 
and  enforcement.  The  extent  to  which  they  resort  to  hierarchical  or  non-hierarchical 
coordination with public and private actors at subordinate levels of government varies both 
between and within the member states. In the relationship between the EU and the member 
states, however, implementation is embedded in the hierarchical structure of supranational 
institutions, at least under the First Pillar (Single Market, Monetary Union) and increasingly 
also under the Third Pillar (Justice and Home Affairs). The shadow of hierarchy is cast by the 
supremacy and direct effect of European Law. The European Commission as the Guardian of 
the Treaties can bring legal proceedings against any member state that violates European 
Law. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has the power to authoritatively settle the case 
(Art. 227, 227 ECT). Competition policy is subject to similar procedures (Art. 82; 88 ECT). 
The member state governments, of course, can avoid hierarchical coordination by defying the 
ECJ  –  the  EU  has  no  coercive  powers  by  which  it  could  force  its  member  states  into 
compliance. Yet, it would constitute a serious breach of European Law. And domestic courts 
and enforcement authorities have to execute the rulings of the ECJ. This is particularly the 
case under the preliminary ruling procedures (Art. 234 ECT) where domestic courts refer 
cases of conflict between national and European Law to the ECJ to settle the issue. 
 
Under the First Pillar, the Commission can also use comitology to hierarchical coordinate the 
implementation of European Law. To execute decisions of the Council, the Commission may 
adopt legally binding measures (Art. 202 ECT). However, the member states have placed the 
executive powers of the Commission under the control of committees that are comprised of 
national  experts.  Their  opinions  are  not  binding,  but  under  the  regulatory  procedure,  an 
objection can nullify the decision of the Commission and the case is referred to the Council.  
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Thus, comitology is a transgovernmental negotiation system that is placed under the double 
shadow of hierarchy of the Commission (outside the regulatory procedure) and of the Council 
(under the regulatory procedures).  
 
In sum, the implementation of EU policies under the First Pillar takes place in the shadow of 
hierarchy of supranational institutions that even reaches inside the member states. Proponents 
of intergovernmentalist approaches might argue that supranational institutions cannot really 
oblige the member states to implement EU policies against their will, since it is the member 
states  which  adopted  these  policies  in  the  first  place.  Rather,  the  member  states  delegate 
executive powers to the Commission as their agent to ensure the effective implementation of 
their political will (Pollack, 1997; Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz, 1998). As the “Masters of the 
Treaties”, the member states remain in firm control over their supranational agent, not only 
through  comitology  but  also  because  they  can  always  change  the  rules  of  the  game  by 
modifying  the  powers  of  the  Commission  in  the  Treaties.  Yet,  the  „shadow  of 
intergovernmental negotiations“ is significantly weakened since by now it rests on the consent 
of 27 member states! 
 
Under the Second and Third Pillar, the legal shadow of hierarchy is absent since the decisions 
by the Council do not fall under the judicial authority of the ECJ nor are they subject to 
comitology. Which forms of governance apply in the implementation of EU policies depends 
even more on the institutions of the member states than under the First Pillar. In any case, this 
paper only considers implementation if the Treaties explicitly specify institutional rules that 
diverge from the general pattern, as it is the case in structural policy.  
 
The  analytical  framework  specifies  different  forms  of  European  governance,  which  are 
conceptualized as institutionalized forms of political coordination. They are constituted by 
differing  combinations  of  institutional  rule  structures  which  support  specific  modes  of 
coordination (figure 1). The typology draws on the work of Fritz Scharpf, whose interaction 
modes focus, however, more on public actors and neglect the embeddedness and nestedness 
of governance forms (Scharpf 1997; Scharpf, 1999; Scharpf, 2001; Scharpf, 2003). 
 
2.2.1  Supranational centralization: hierarchical coordination by supranational actors 
Unlike the modern state, the EU cannot rely on a legitimate monopoly of force to bring its 
member states into compliance with European Law. Yet, supranational institutions entail a  
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strong element of hierarchy, since they can bind the member states against their will. This is 
particularly the case for authoritative decisions of the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, and the European Court of Justice, which do not require the consent. 
 
2.2.2  Supranational joint decision-making: negotiations in the shadow of hierarchy7 
Majority  decisions  in  the  Council  entail  hierarchical  coordination  of  the  minority  by  the 
majority. At the same time, however, the „Luxembourg Compromise“ established a strong 
norm of consensus-seeking and has transformed the „Community Method“ under the First 
Pillar in a inter- and transgovernmental negotiation system, in which the representatives of 
national and at times subnational governments seek to reach political agreements under the 
mediation of the European Commission. With the subsequent empowerment of the European 
Parliament (EP), actor constellations increasingly include members of parliament, which in 
turn  have  to  negotiate  a  common  position  adopted  by  majority  rule.  The  shadow  of 
supranational hierarchy becomes weaker, if the Council decides by unanimity and the co-
decision or co-operation procedure does not apply. In these cases, the institutionalized rule 
structures resemble more purely inter- and transgovernmental negotiation systems as we find 
them under the Second and Third Pillar.  
 
2.2.3  Mutual recognition: regulatory competition in the shadow of hierarchy 
Supranational Institutions do also cast a shadow of hierarchy on competition in the Single 
Market.  The  principle  of  mutual  recognition,  which  the  ECJ  established  in  1979  with  its 
seminal  Cassis  de  Dijon  decision,  constitutes  the  framework  for  a  moderate  regulatory 
competition  between  the  member  states  (Sun  and  Pelkmans,  1995:  68f.).  European  Law 
mandates  the  opening  of  national  market  (market-making  or  negative  integration)  and 
generates competitive pressure not only on domestic companies but also on public regulation 
of the member states. In a nutshell, the principle of mutual recognition allows high-regulating 
countries to maintain their regulatory standards but prevents them from using those standards 
as non-tariff trade barriers. A good produced in one member states has to be granted access to 
the  markets  of  any  other  member  state,  even  if  the  product  standards  are  higher  in  the 
importing than in the exporting member state. The access can only be denied if compliance 
with the higher standards is in the imminent public interest of the receiving country and is 
                                                 
7   On the shadow of hierarchy and  (new) modes of governance in the EU see Héritier, 2003 und the findings of 
Project No. 5 „New Modes of Governance in the Shadow of Hierarchy“, which is part of the Integrated 
Project „New Modes of Governance “ funded by the 6
th Framework Programme of the European Union 
http://www.eu-newgov.org/datalists/project_detail.asp?Project_ID=05, last access 21.2.2007.  
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subject to judicial review by the ECJ. Thus, while fostering competition, the principle of 
mutual recognition constrains the dynamics of a race-to-the bottom by the requirement to 
(implicitly)  agree  on  minimum  standards.  It  thereby  significantly  expands  the  shadow  of 
supranational hierarchy under the First Pillar since the dismantling of non-tariff barriers does 
not require the consent of the member states – unlike the harmonization of national standards 
at the EU level. This form of “horizontal transfer of sovereignty” (Nicolaidis and Shaffer, 
2005) has been increasingly invoked under the Third Pillar, e.g. in the area of asylum and 
immigration policy (Schmidt, 2007). 
 
2.2.4  Intergovernmental cooperation: negotiations between governmental actors 
Under supranational centralization and supranational joint decision-making have no or only 
limited formal decision powers, the opposite is true for the intergovernmental cooperation 
under the Second and Third Pillar. The (European) Council usually decides by unanimity and 
shares the right of initiative with the Commission. The Parliament is at best consulted, and the 
ECJ has only limited power of judicial review (Art. 35 para 6 EUT). In the First Pillar, a new 
form  of  transgovernmental  negotiation  systems  has  been  emerging,  in  which  national 
regulatory agencies coordinate their regulatory activities e.g. on standards of data protection 
and the licensing of pharmaceuticals. 
 
2.2.5  Open Method of coordination: political competition in the shadow of negotiations 
The  Open  Method  of  Coordination  (OMC)  is  based  on  inter-  and  transgovernmental 
negotiation systems, in which the governments of the member states agree on joint goals, 
which are legally non-binding and in which supranational actors are not formally included. 
Within  an  agreed-upon  time  frame,  the  member  states  then  develop  national  action  plans 
whose  implementation  is  subject  to  regular  review  and  evaluation  to  foster  processes  of 
mutual learning through the identification of best practice. The member states enter in a sort 
of political competition, in which they compete for the best performance in reaching joint 
goals. By outperforming other member states, they gain a competitive advantage in attracting 
or  keeping  economic  activities.  OMC  provides  for  the  participation  of  non-state  actors. 
Depending  on  their  involvement,  OMC  resembles  an  inter-  or  transgovernmental  or  an 
intermediate negotiation system.  
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2.2.6  Network governance: negotiations between public and private actors 
Formal  and  informal  EU-institutions  often  provide  for  the  consultation  of  economic  and 
societal interests by the Commission, the Parliament and the representatives of the member 
states. In some cases, the Treaties even allow for the participation of non-state actors in EU 
negotiation systems on equal basis. Such intermediate negotiation systems between public and 
private actors are often referred to as network governance (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999; 
Kohler-Koch  and  Rittberger,  2006).  At  the  informal  level,  we  also  find  a  vast  variety  of 
interactions between EU decision-makers, both national and supranational, and (trans)national 
representatives of economic and societal interests. However, in order to qualify as informal 
negotiation systems, they have to be stable over time and engage in joint-decision making 
rather than merely being arenas for the exchange views. 
 
2.2.7  Delegated/regulated  self-coordination:  private  negotiations  in  the  shadow  of 
hierarchy 
Instead of negotiating with private actors, the Commission and the Council can also delegate 
regulation to private negotiation systems. With the exception of the Social Dialogue, this is 
hardly done at a systemic level but within individual policies setting the legal framework for 
the  self-coordination  of  private  actors.  They  place  their  regulatory  activities  under  the 
hierarchical supervision of supranational actors, which may hold ultimate decision-making 
powers or can substitute for private regulation in case of suboptimal or failed outcomes. This 
is  also  the  case  for  voluntary  environmental  or  social  agreements,  which  are  negotiated 
without the participation of Commission, Council and Parliament but have to conform to the 
parameters formulated by supranational actors. 
 
2.2.8  Private interest government: private negotiation systems 
Private actors may coordinate themselves without having  a mandate from or being under 
supervision of supranational institutions. Economic interests have organized themselves at the 
EU-level in umbrella organizations. The so called Euro-groups have the possibility to take 
binding decisions for their members, e.g. codes of conduct, and monitor compliance. Yet, if 
private  interest  government  negotiates  voluntary  agreements  in  which  members  commit 
themselves to  certain standards in order to avoid public regulation, the shadow hierarchy 
looms again. 
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2.2.9  Regulatory and tax competition 
While competition in the EU mostly takes place under the shadow of supranational hierarchy 
and inter- or transgovernmental negotiation systems, some areas are neither subject to the 
principle of mutual recognition nor the Open Method of Coordination. Rather, member states 
adjust  their  social  and  tax  policies  in  order  to  avoid  competitive  disadvantages  and  gain 
competitive advantages, respectively (Scharpf, 2001: 7-8).  
 
Figure  1  summarizes  the  different  forms  of  European  governance,  which  will  guide  the 
empirical analysis in the next section. A comprehensive coding of the more than 20 policy 
areas that are subject to EU regulation would go beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, 
the analysis reveals some interesting patterns. We will see that the EU mostly governs through 
trans-  and  intergovernmental  negotiation  and  competition  systems  that  operate  under  the 
shadow of supranational hierarchy.  
 
 
3.   European Governance – Negotiation and Competition in the Shadow of Hierarchy 
 
Consistent with the analytical framework developed in the previous section, the empirical 
study  of  European  forms  of  governance  in  the  various  policy  sectors  takes  the  formal 
institutions prescribed by the Treaties as a starting point. (cf. Börzel, 2005b). They determine 
which actors – (supra-/sub) national public vs. private – have access to the EU policy process 
and to which modes of coordination they can resort. Again, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to provide a comprehensive mapping of the modes of coordination in different policy 
sectors. Rather, the following section seeks to identify “possibility frontiers” for the different 
governance mixes. It draws as much as possible on the existing literature in order to account 
for the extent to which forms of governance are not only defined by European Primary and 
Secondary Law or other agreements but are actually applied. Figure 2 summarizes the major 
findings of the analysis. 
 
3.1  The Long Shadow of Supranational Hierarchy 
 
The first thing that is striking about the EU is that while all three ideal types of governance 
forms are present, they are hardly found in isolation. The supranational institutions of the EC-
Treaty provide ample possibility for hierarchical coordination at the EU-level. Supranational  
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centralization  reigns  where  supranational  actors  have  the  powers  to  take  legally  binding 
decisions without requiring the consent of the member states. Thus, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) authoritatively defines EU monetary policy (Art. 105 ECT). The presidents of 
the national central banks of the member states are represented in the ECB Council. However, 
they are not subject to any mandate (Art. 108 ECT). In competition policy, the Commission 
can conduct investigations against cases of suspected infringements, impose sanctions and 
take legal recourse to the ECJ (Art. 82 ECT; Art. 88 ECT). Strictly speaking, the supervision 
of  agreements  and  mergers  between  undertaking  as  well  as  state  aid  control  fall  under 
implementation  rather  than  decision-making,  since  the  Commission  enforces  competition 
rules set by Articles 81, 87 ECT and a series of directives and regulations, which have been 
adopted by qualified majority since the Amsterdam Treaty. In case of public undertakings, 
however, the Commission can adopt legally binding regulations without the consent of the 
member  states  if  privileges  of  public  undertakings  constitute  a  major  obstacle  to  the 
completion of the Single Market (Art. 86 para. 3 ECT). The Commission has only invoked 
these  powers  once,  when  it  sought  to  break  open  national  monopolies  in  the 
telecommunication sector (Schneider, 2001; Schmidt, 1998). But it has alluded several times 
to  the  possibility  of  using  Art.  86  ECT,  if  member  states  and  public  undertakings  are 
unwilling  to  negotiate  a  subsequent  liberalization  of  the  energy  sector  (Matlary,  1997; 
Schmidt,  1998;  Eising,  2000).  The  shadow  of  hierarchy  is  reinforced  by  power  of  the 
Commission to bring infringement proceedings against member states violating the principles 
of free and fair competition (Héritier, 2001). 
 
Finally,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  can  bind  the  member  states  against  their  will  by 
interpreting  European  Law.  This  form  of  supranational  centralization  is  not  confined  to 
market making (Scharpf, 2001). With the dynamic interpretation of the Treaties in its case law 
(Weiler, 1981), the ECJ has expanded European regulation beyond negative integration. For 
instance, the ECJ empowered the EC to enact social and environmental regulations at a time 
when the member states had not yet bestowed the EC with the necessary competencies (Knill, 
2003: 22). In a similar vein, the ECJ established the principle of state and damages liability 
for violations of European Law (Craig, 1993, , 1997). While ECJ case law is a direct form of 
supranational centralization, it also has a significant indirect effect by casting a shadow of 
hierarchy on inter- and transgovernmental negotiation systems. This is particularly the case 
for the unilateral removal of national regulatory standards used by the member states as non-
tariff barriers to the freedom of goods and services. The supranational shadow of hierarchy  
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provides  an  important  incentive  for  public  and  private  actors  to  agree  on  a  subsequent 
deregulation  at  the  national  level,  which  may  give  rise  to  re-regulation  at  the  EU-level 
(Héritier, 2001). A particularly interesting example is the impact of ECJ case law on national 
tax regulation (O'Brien, 2005) and public health policy (Graser, 2004), since the EU has only 
limited competencies in these two areas. The member states will thus have to negotiate in the 
shadow  of  competition  created  by  supranational  centralization  if  they  wish  to  adapt  their 
national regulations to European requirements of the freedom of services and capital. 
 
In  sum,  the  EU  consists  of  hierarchical  institutionalized  rule  structures,  which  offer  the 
Commission,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  and  the  European  Central  Bank  ample 
opportunities  for  hierarchical  coordination.  Supranational  centralization  gains  even  more 
relevance by casing a strong shadow of hierarchy, in which the member states negotiate to 
reach agreements, mostly – but not exclusively – on market making policies. ECJ case law, in 
particular, increasingly interferes with market correcting and welfare state policies. At the 
same time, the ECJ operates in the shadow of intergovernmental negotiations by which the 
member  states  as  the  “Masters  of  the  treaties”  can  change  the  rules  of  supranational 
centralization and exempt certain areas from the reach of the ECJ. If the constitutional level of 
EU meta-governance is also taken into consideration, we find a threefold embeddedness of 
institutionalized rule structures. 
 
The shadow of supranational centralization is significantly enlarged in the areas subject to 
supranational join decision-making, in which the Council decides by qualified majority and 
supranational institutions set the rules for implementation. This applies to almost all policies 
under the First Pillar but also for the framework decisions under the Third Pillar (Art, 35 para. 
1 EUT). In other words, the core areas of EU policy-making are embedded in hierarchical 
structures.  The  latter  form  the  institutional  framework  for  inter-  and  transgovernmental 
negotiation systems, which dominate the supranational policy process. While the so called 
Community Method grants the Commission and the European Parliament a significant say, 
EU decision-making is still dominated by the Council with its numerous working groups and 
the  Committee  of  Permanent  Representatives  as  well  as  the  expert  committees  of  the 
Commission,  which  prepare  legal  proposals  and  execute  Council  decisions  (comitology). 
These formalized negotiation systems are embedded in transgovernmental networks, which 
span across several levels of government and stages of the policy process. The networks serve 
supranational,  national  and  subnational  actors  to  coordinate  their  interests  and  reach  
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agreements through the exchange of resources and arguments. While they mostly seek to 
influence  supranational  and  intergovernmental  decision-making,  they  may  also  produce 
regulatory outcomes. For instance, national regulatory agencies formed European regulatory 
networks  in  order  to  coordinate  their  regulatory  activities  in  response  to  the  EU-induced 
liberalization of national markets. Informal transgovernmental negotiation systems, such as 
the European Competition Network (ECN, Wilks, 2005: 131), have emerged in several policy 
sectors (see below). 
 
The shadow of hierarchy cast by majority decisions in the Council and authoritative decisions 
by the Commission or the ECJ, respectively, has a significant influence on the dynamics and 
outcomes of inter- and transgovernmental negotiation systems (Golub, 1999; Tsebelis and 
Garrett,  1997;  Börzel,  2003).  On  the  one  hand,  the  perceived  “threat”  of  a  unilaterally 
imposed decision increases the willingness of governmental actors to compromise. On the 
other hand, inter- and transgovernmental actors have to make sure that their agreements are 
likely  to  stand  scrutiny  by  the  Commission  and  the  ECJ.  The  parameters  set  by  their 
interpretation of European Law are not always oriented towards mere market liberalization 
and free competition but may also support market correcting policies (Héritier, 2001). The 
“dual  mechanism  of  anticipated  reactions  and  the  fleet  in  being”  (Scharpf  1997:  200)  is 
particularly prevalent in the Single Market but also impacts upon other policy sectors, such as 
the environment, social policy and tax policy. 
 
Private actors are consulted throughout the entire EU policy process at the different levels of 
government involved. Yet, they rarely enjoy a seat on the negotiation table. And unlike in the 
“negotiating  state”,  Europe-wide  forms  of  private  interest  government  in  the  shadow  of 
hierarchy have hardly emerged. If at all, we find them in the area of technical standardization 
and,  increasingly,  in  the  liberalization  of  public  utilities.  EU  technical  standardization  is 
mostly  voluntary  since  supranational  harmonization  is  confined  to  national  regulations 
concerning the public interest. For the other areas, the Council delegated the task to develop 
technical standards to three private organizations (CEN, Cenelec und ETSI). The technical 
standards are not legally  binding but are subject to a conformity assumption, which only 
applies,  however,  if  the  member  states  to  not  voice  objections  during  the  comitology 
procedure (Gehring et al. 2007). The standardizing organizations have – with the exception of 
ETSI – only one representative per member state. Since national standardizing organizations 
are not always private, self-regulation is not only regulated by the EU and subject to the  
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control of the member states through comitology. It also involves public actors. This is also 
the case for the regulatory networks, that emerged in the regulation of pharmaceuticals and 
food stuff (Koutalakis 2006; Gehring et al. 2007) as well as the deregulation of public utilities 
(Eberlein, 2001; Héritier and Coen, 2005; Smith, 2005). We need detailed case studies to find 
out whether private actors are merely consulted or have a real voice not to mention a vote. But 
what seems to be clear by now is that these regulatory networks were first of all set up to 
release the Commission from the burden of implementing market creating regulation (Gehring 
et al. 2007). 
 
The partnership principle in structural policy also provides for the involvement of private 
actors in inter- and transgovernmental negotiation systems. The literature  calls it a prime 
example of network governance. Yet, if at all, it constitutes only very  weak intermediate 
negotiation systems, which operate under a very strong shadow of hierarchy. The Treaties 
explicitly prescribe the involvement of the social partners – beyond the consultation of the 
Economic and Social Committee – for the management of the European Social Funds. Their 
representatives  are  members  of  the  management  committee,  in  which  the  member  state 
governments are represented as well and which is chaired by the European Commission (Art. 
147 ECT). There are also several EU regulations, which specify the partnership principle and 
provide for the participation of the social and  economic partners  at the various stages of 
programming (cf. 1260/99/EC: Chapter IV, Art. 8). Moreover, a recent regulation extends the 
partnership principle to include civil society (1083/2006/EC). But the extent, to which private 
actors are actually involved, is contested in the literature and varies significantly across the 
member  states.  The  concept  of  multilevel  governance  emerged  from  studies  of  structural 
policy.  But  it  has  focused  on  the  role  of  local  and  regional  governments  (Marks,  1992; 
Hooghe, 1996; Bache and Flinders, 2004). Private actors have hardly  been systematically 
considered. But it seems that economic and social partners still have a marginal role compared 
to national, regional and local governments. And while the partnership principle may seek to 
encourage the building of intermediate negotiation systems, it would always operate in the 
shadow of hierarchy, since private actors do not have a veto over the decisions taken. In any 
case, there is certainly not enough empirical evidence to speak of network governance in 
structural policy. 
 
The Social Dialogue is undoubtedly the most significant form of private self-coordination in 
the shadow of supranational hierarchy (Art. 139 ECT). In selected areas of social policy, the  
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social partners have the right to conclude agreements, which can be turned into European Law 
(Falkner, 1998). This form of Euro-corporatism is unique and has hardly been invoked. Other 
forms of private self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy are equally rare. While voluntary 
agreements  at  the  national  level  abound,  they  have  only  been  hardly  used  by  European 
business  organizations  to  prevent  EU  regulation.  If  at  all,  they  are  found  in  the  area  of 
environmental  and  consumer  protection  (vgl.  Calster  and  Deketelaere,  2001;  Héritier  and 
Eckert, forthcoming). 
 
Private interest government as the ideal type of private negotiation systems is as much an 
exception  as  its  public-private  counterpart  of  network  governance.  As  we  have  seen,  the 
partnership principle has not given rise to intermediate negation systems at the EU level. And 
even within the member states, private actor involvement remains limited. We find some 
inceptions of public-private partnerships in the area of research and development (e.g. co-
funding of Galileo).  
 
While private and intermediate negotiation systems are hardly found in the EU, a complex 
European competition system has emerged in the shadow of hierarchy cast by supranational 
institutions.  Each  market  can  be  conceptualized  as  a  hierarchically  regulated  competition 
system. What is special about the European market is the principle of mutual recognition, 
which  is  a  form  of  supranational  competition  rule  that  does  not  have  to  rely  on  the 
harmonization of national regulations. Its application in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, 
e.g. regarding the (non-)recognition of asylum seekers, illustrates that the principle of mutual 
recognition can work outside the Single Market, if the national regulations of member states 
are  too  divergent  to  allow  for  agreement  in  the  inter-  and  transgovernmental  negotiation 
systems (Schmidt, 2007; Wagner 2007). As a result, the shadow of supranational institutions 
creeps into areas, which the member states explicitly sought to seal off their influence. Unlike 
in the Single Market, however, the principle of mutual recognition is not to facilitate the 
removal of non-tariff barriers but, on the contrary, shall help to establish market correcting 
policies.  It  may  sound  cynical  to  conceive  of  asylum  seekers,  migrants  and  criminals  as 
problems of market failure. But the completion of the Single Market does indeed create a 
need for coordination in the area of internal security and immigration. The removal of border 
controls, envisioned already by the Schengen Treaty of 1985 and made European Primary 
Law with the Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 61-69 ECT), renders the control of illegal immigration 
and transborder crime extremely difficult. The functional interdependence between market  
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integration and internal security has led to a spill-over effect as a result of which significant 
parts  of  the  Third  Pillar  have  been  subsequently  transferred  into  the  First  Pillar  (Börzel, 
2005b).  Where  the  member  states  have  been  unable  to  agree  on  supranationalization,  the 
principle of mutual recognition applies. 
 
The principle of mutual recognition covers a wide range of policy sectors under the First and 
Third Pillar. However, there are areas of competition between the member states, which are 
neither  regulated  by  supranational  institutions  nor  placed  under  the  shadow  of  inter-  and 
transgovernmental negotiation systems (on the latter see below) or which operate outside any 
political coordination by the EU level.  For reasons of scope, this paper cannot deal with 
unmitigated  regulatory  or  tax  competition.  It  mostly  concerns  process-regulation  and 
(redistributive) welfare state policies. 
 
3.2  Inter- und transgovernmental cooperation and its shadow 
 
The areas of intergovernmental cooperation, which the member states explicitly sealed against 
shadow of supranational hierarchy, largely correspond to the ideal type of public negotiation 
systems.  European  decisions  rests  on  the  voluntary  coordination  of  the  member  states 
(unanimity or consent) and often do not have legally binding character. (soft law). They are 
prepared and accompanied by inter- and transgovernmental networks, which act free from the 
shadow of hierarchy. This is not only true for the Second and parts of the Third Pillar, but also 
for selected areas under the First (parts of social policy, macroeconomic and employment 
policy, research and development, culture, education, taxation), in which the EU has no or 
only very limited competencies and the influence of the supranational troika (Commission, 
Parliament and Court) is severely restricted. In order to generate the necessary coordination at 
the EU-level, member states have increasingly resorted to the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC),  which  constitutes  a  form  of  political  competition  in  the  shadow  of  inter-  und 
transgovernmental negotiation systems.  
 
OMC has no basis in the Treaties. It emerged as the main instrument to implement the so 
called Lisbon Strategy, which the European Council adopted in 2000 in order to promote 
economic growth and competitiveness in the EU. OMC works on the voluntary agreement of 
joint goals, which are legally not binding. In order to realize these goals, the member states 
develop national action plans whose implementation is monitored and evaluated on the basis  
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of common indicators. The member states shall compete for best practices which are to trigger 
processes of mutual learning. OMC is in principle open for the participation of non-state 
actors.  Yet,  in  practice,  it  has  largely  taken  the  form  of  inter-  and  transgovernmental 
negotiations with hardly any involvement of private actors (Rhodes, 2005: 295-300; Borrás 
and Jacobsson, 2004: 193-4). 
 
In the meantime, OMC has traveled beyond Lisbon and is applied in asylum and immigration 
policy  (Wagner  2007),  health  policy  (Smismans,  2006)  or  environmental  policy 
(Lenschow/Reiter  2007).  With  the  exception  of  environmental  and  social  policy,  private 
actors, again, have hardly any role to play neither in the formulation of joint goals at the EU 
level nor in their implementation at the national level (Hodson and Maher, 2001; Héritier, 
2003; Armstrong, 2003 170-94). Intergovernmental cooperation sets the rules for the political 
competition among the member states. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper explored the nature of European governance. The first part developed an analytical 
framework that identified 10 different forms of governance for the EU. The categories used 
heavily  draw  on  the  work  of  Fritz  Scharpf  whose  typology  of  political  coordination  in 
multilevel  systems  sought  to  overcome  the  dichotomy  of  intergovernmentalism  and 
supranationalism that has dominated EU policy-making. The  analytical  framework of this 
paper modifies the four types of governance developed by Scharpf in order to accommodate 
the  role  of  private  actors,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  account  for  the  embeddedness  of 
governance structures on the other. The second part used the analytical framework to study 
the governance mix in the various areas of EU policy-making. The empirical findings confirm 
the usual portray as the EU as a multilevel negotiation system. However, the analysis reveals 
several characteristics of the EU that have been largely overlooked in the literature. First, EU 
negotiation  systems  are  mostly  embedded  in  hierarchical  structures  established  by 
supranational institutions. Second, EU negotiation systems are dominated by governmental 
actors. Third, governmental actors negotiate in the supranational shadow of hierarchy not only 
in the First Pillar. By applying the principle of mutual recognition in areas of Justice and 
Home  Affairs,  the  supranational  shadow  of  hierarchy  increasingly  reaches  into  the  Third 
Pillar,  which  the  member  states  sought  to  confine  to  intergovernmental  cooperation  only.  
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Fourth, in areas not subject to the supranational shadow of hierarchy, member states rely on 
inter- and transgovernmental cooperation to coordinate their policies. This is not only the case 
in sensitive areas of internal and external security but increasingly concerns welfare state 
policy. The Open Method of Coordination is a major attempt to regulate the redistributive 
consequences of economic competition for the national social security systems. It relies on 
political competition to coordinate national policies and have them adjust to jointly agreed 
goals.  
 
Despite attempts to use OMC in order to institutionalize member state coordination in areas of 
(re-)distributive  policy,  European  governance  continues  to  focus  on  regulatory  policy. 
Member state  governments negotiate in the shadow of supranational institutions the rules 
according to which they whish to compete in the Single Market. These rules do not only aim 
to  open  national  markets  but  shall  also  reduce  social  and  political  risks  created  by 
liberalization and deregulation. The EU has been rightly described as a “regulatory state” 
which, does not possess any significant redistributive capacities (Majone, 1994; cf. Eberlein, 
2001). This is a much more decisive difference between the EU and the modern state than the 
lack of a legitimate monopoly of force. The EU may not be capable of directly coercing the 
member states into compliance with its laws. Rather, hierarchical coordination draws on the 
supremacy and direct effect of European Law according to which supranational actors can 
rely on national courts and authorities for enforcement. In other words, the EU can lend on the 
legitimate monopoly of force of its member states.  
 
Beside a very weak redistributive capacity, the EU distinguishes itself from the modern state 
by the weak role which private actors play in EU policy-making. This is not to say that they 
are involved in the policy process. Yet, their formal participatory rights are limited and mostly 
confined to  consultation. Rather, economic and societal actors have established numerous 
informal  relationships  with  the  Commission,  the  Parliament  and  the  member  states 
governments, where they exchange resources and arguments. These networks vary in form 
and density across policy sectors and stages of the policy process (cf. Peterson and Bomberg, 
1999) and are a major characteristic of the EU system of multilevel governance. However, 
such informal negotiation systems are nothing special or unique to the EU but a constitutive 
feature  of  the  modern  state  in  the  21st  century  (Scharpf,  1991).  Moreover,  networks  are 
mostly found in the “soft” stages of the policy cycle. They help to identify societal problems, 
to set them on the political agenda, and to formulate policies to address the problems. But the  
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decisions are still taken by supranational actors or in inter- and transgovernmental negotiation 
systems that mostly operate under the shadow of supranational institutions. In short, the EU 
governs with but hardly through networks (Börzel, 2005a). Private self-regulation and private 
interest  government  are  equally  rare.  It  is  the  dominance  of  governmental  actors  that 
distinguishes European governance from both, governance within and beyond the state.  
 
The  governance  literature  has  identified  two  conditions  for  the  emergence  of  private  and 
intermediate negotiation systems:8 a strong state (shadow of hierarchy) and a strong society 
(autonomous and resourceful private actors; cf. Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995: 21-23; Mayntz, 
1993a:  41;  Mayntz,  1996:  157-163).  Even  if  the  EU  lacks  coercive  power,  supranational 
actors have significant capacities for hierarchical coordination. Moreover, forms of private 
self-regulation  and  public-private  co-regulation  abound  in  international  politics  –  in  the 
absence of any hierarchy (cf. Cutler, Haufler and Porter, 1999; Biersteker and Hall, 2002; 
Börzel and Risse, 2005).9 The shadow of hierarchy can therefore hardly explain why the EU 
has  not  developed  any  significant  forms  of  network  or  private  interest  government.  The 
organizational weakness of private actors appears to be more promising. While the number of 
transnational interest groups in Brussels is constantly on the rise (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 
2005), they may be not strong enough to engage in collective action required for private self-
regulation or co-regulation. Their weakness may be due to the heterogeneity of interests and a 
strong  orientation  towards  national  concerns.  Finally,  the  member  states  may  have  little 
incentive to involve private actors in the policy process. Proponents of intergovernmentalist 
approaches to EU policy-making have argued that member states have delegated national 
policy competencies to the EU level in order to increase their autonomy vis-à-vis domestic 
interests (Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1994). The Commission, in turn, takes advantage of the 
private  actor  resources  to  increase  its  action  capacity.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the 
Commission seeks to preserve its autonomy and has no interest to extend the involvement of 
private actors beyond informal and formal consultations. Against this background, it seems 
likely that executive dominance in the EU will prevail. This has significant implications for 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of European  governance that cannot be discussed in this 
paper. Suffice to say that even if the Constitutional Treaty will come into force in its present 
form, it will not change the nature of the EU as a predominantly inter- and transgovernmental 
negotiation system that operates in the shadow of supranational hierarchy (Börzel, 2005c). 
                                                 
8   On the following see Börzel, 2007a. 
9   The “shadow of anarchy” (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995: 25) may indeed explain the different between the EU 
and the international level (cf. Börzel, forthcoming.   
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